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CROSSING GUARDS ON THE ELECTRONIC HIGHWAY:
THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER
CONVERGENCE TECHNOLOGY
ALAN

Rosst &

JENNIFER PAWSON*

New communications technologies have emerged that involve the
convergence of television, computer, cable, telephone and satellite.
Proponents of these new technologies envision an explosion in the
number of different channels which can offer programming. As well,
convergence technology "is expected to make TV sets interactive,
ushering in an era of 'pick-and-pay', do-it-yourself programming." 1
This development has been described in the popular media as an
"electronic highway." 2 When such "highways" function as conduits of
programming for the general public they are best characterized as
broadcasting.
The controversy regarding jurisdiction over the electronic highway has been highlighted in the proceedings of recent CRTC
hearings on the streamlining of telecommunications regulations.3
The anticipated incursion of telephone companies into broadcasting-type services has engendered concern in the cable industry.
Telecommunications companies hope to escape the supervision of
the CRTC, to which cable companies are subject, because of the
different technologies each utilizes.
Federal jurisdiction over broadcasting has been based on the exception to exclusive competence over local works and undertakings
found in the combination of ss. 91(29) and 92(10)(a) of the
t LL.B. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
* B. Arts & Sc. (McMaster), LL.B. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
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C. Harris, "CRTC to pick specialty channels. Decision will be step toward
transformation of television" The Globe and Mail (14 February 1994) Al.
2 D. Flavelle, "Paving the Way for an Electronic Highway" The Toronto Star
(24 October 1993) GI.
3 H. Enchin, "CRTC heads down new road. Hearing weighs competing
interests of the information highway" The Globe and Mail (1 November 1993)
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Constitution Act, 1867. 4 Electronic highways may simply use different technologies to do that which has historically been conceived
of as broadcasting. Accordingly, they should fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government. The fact that this technology has
a national dimension to it makes federal control all the more appropriate.
Changes to the Broadcasting Act5 suggest that electronic highways used to disseminate programming are a "broadcasting" activity as defined bys. 2(1) of that Act. The historical evolution of the
Broadcasting Act indicates that Parliament has adopted, in the present version of the Act, an expanded approach to the definition of
broadcasting which removes the previous limits on the technology
involved. This suggests that federal involvement in the regulation of
new broadcasting technology is consistent with previous federal
mandates. 6
In the 1968 version of the Broadcasting Act, "broadcasting" was
defined to mean "any radiocommunication in which the transmissions
are intended for direct reception by the general public" [emphasis
added].7 In 1991, the new Broadcasting Act redefined the term as
referring to
any transmission of programs, whether or not encrypted,
by radio waves or other means of telecommunication for reception by the public by means of a broadcast receiving
apparatus, but does not include any such transmission of
programs that is made solely for performance or display
in a public place [emphasis added],

and 2(2) goes on to say:
For the purposes of this Act, "other means of telecommunication" means any wire, cable, radio, optical or

4

Constitution Act, 1867(U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, ss. 91(29), 92(10)(a); Radio
Reference, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.); Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. CRTC,
[1978] 2S.C.R 141; PublicServiceBoardv. Dionne, [1978] 2S.C.R. 191.
5 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11 as am. by the Telecommunications Act, S.C.
1993, c. 38, s. 81.
6 Canadian Voices: Canadian Choices (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988). See also
S. Scott, "The New Broadcasting Act: An Analysis" (1990) 1 M.C.L.R. 25 at 2627.
7 Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-9, s. 2.
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other electromagnetic system, or any similar technical
system. 8
The expansion of the definition of "broadcasting" within the

Broadcasting Act to refer to an increased scope of technology has
been a calculated and purposeful endeavour. In 1986, the Task Force
on Broadcasting Policy maintained that:
The Act should broaden the definition of broadcasting
and related concepts to cover all types of program reception and distribution whether by Hertzian waves or
through any other technology [emphasis added]. 9
Parliament clearly wanted to ensure that no undertakings were excluded from the definition of broadcasting simply because the
technology used was innovative or unprecedented.
Changes in the Act to notions of what comprises the viewing
audience further ensure that electronic highways are not excluded
from the definition of broadcasting.
Jurisprudence decided under the old Broadcasting Act1° held that
broadcasting required an intention to transmit directly to the
general public in order to come within the meaning of
"broadcasting" under that Act. 11 Because transmissions over fibreoptic wire, unlike radio communications, cannot be intercepted and
can be limited to exclusive groups of users, a requirement for a
broad audience could have taken some applications of convergence
technology out of the realm of the old Broadcasting Act. The significance of cases which imply that the public, in the context of broadcasting, is "the general public," and represents large numbers of
people, 12 has been undermined by changes to the definition of
"broadcasting." Arguably, Parliament was reacting to such cases
when it removed both the requirement for intention, and the word
"general," modifying "public," in the new Broadcasting Act.13 This

B Supra

note 5.
"Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, September 1986" in
R. Bird, ed., Documents of Canadian Broadcasting (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1988) 704 at 737. See also S. Scott, supra note 6 at 33.
10 Supra note 5.
11 Lount Corp. v. Canada (A.G.) (1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) 305 at 311.
12 Supra note 11. See also R. v. Communicomp Data Ltd. (1975) 6 O.R. (2d) 680
(Co. Ct.).
l3 Supra note 6.
9
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further supports the position that "highways" ought to be considered
within the scope of broadcasting.
The words of the new Broadcasting Act, when compared with the
earlier definition of "broadcasting" imply that the public is not the
general public, but can encompass much less "general" groups.
Decisions have held that the meaning of the word "public" must be
context specific. 14 It should be acknowledged that a change in
legislation will be a fundamental part of that context.
The nature of the Broadcasting system itself is the most significant part of the context, giving meaning to the word "broadcasting"
in the definition of broadcasting. Broadcasting in Canada is a
system which has many constituent parts reaching different subgroups of the "general public" who still comprise the "public." 15 An
interpretation that the "public" necessarily means a large number of
people, broadly situated, frustrates the purpose of the changes to the
Broadcasting Act to ensure its application to a wide scope of
technology. Users of cable services are often limited geographically
and in number, yet cable has consistently been characterized as
broadcasting. 16 Courts should be reticent to exclude programming
undertakings from the ambit of broadcasting merely because of the
point-to-point nature of convergence technology they use.
The fact that there may be an eligibility requirement in order
to use certain services of an electronic highway, such as paying a fee,
or being enrolled in a course, does not mean that "the admitted few
lose their identity as members of the public." 17 Indeed, the
Broadcasting Act contemplates that broadcasting may be connected
to other undertakings without ceasing to be "broadcasting." 18
After having established that electronic highways come within
the ambit of broadcasting when used for program dissemination,
the argument that they should fall under federal jurisdiction is enhanced by an inquiry into the nature and role of the broadcasting
system within Canadian society. Legislative jurisdiction over com14

Atlantic Shopping Centres Ltd. v. Newfoundland (A.G.) (1988), 71 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 175. See also ]enningsv. Stephens (1934), [1936] l Ch. 469.
15 Supra note 5, s. 3(2).
16 Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canada (CTRC), supra note 4.
17 In University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 at 382, the
Supreme Court of Canada found that students in universities retained their
identity as members of the public in the context of the Canadian Human Rights
Act.
18 Supra note 5, s. 4(3).
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munications is divided between the federal and provincial legislatures through the operation of 92(10) and 91(29). 19 The exception
stated ins. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 establishes that
provinces have the power to make laws in relation to:
Local works and undertakings other than such as are of the
following classes:
(a) Lines of steam or other ships, railways, canals,
telegraphs, and other works and undertakings con necting the province with any other or other of the
provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the
province. 20

Electronic highways fall within this class of exception because the
nature of those undertakings is interprovincial, rather than local.
Some would argue that not all applications of convergence
technology to broadcasting fall within federal legislative competence. The very nature of fibre-optics, as a closed system of pointto-point communication, allows undertakings to be designed which
do not extend beyond provincial borders. Unlike radio, television
and existing cable systems, parts of which all include signals external to the system, convergence activities may be entirely self-contained. Therefore, the historical rationale for federal jurisdiction
over broadcasting21 may not apply to, for example, an undertaking
that uses convergence to transmit videos directly to people's homes
within a single province. The fact that some of the material offered
through such services may have extraprovincial content will not
bring it within the interprovincial exception from provincial
competence. 22
Nevertheless, a broader ground for federal legislative competence over broadcasting helps articulate why electronic highways do
l9 P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) at 566-568.
20 Constitutional Act, 1867, supra note 4, s. 92(10)(a).
21 Federal jurisdiction over radiocommunication, television and cable
undertakings which transmit programs received from the airwaves has been based
on the interprovincial nature of broadcasting which uses "the airwaves" which do
not respect provincial boundaries. See Radio Reference, supra note 4; Capital
Cities Communications v. CRTC, supra note 4; Public Service Bd. v. Dionne, supra
note 4.
22 In NS. Board o/Censorsv. McNeii [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662, the Supreme Court of
Canada found that the display of extraprovincial films was not sufficient to
remove the regulation of theatres from provincial legislative competence.
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not resemble local undertakings and should therefore not fall within
provincial jurisdiction. Although federal jurisdiction over
electronic highways may slightly encroach on provincial
jurisdiction under 92(10), this incidental effect is essential for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over broadcasting.
The system of broadcasting in Canada is a functional arrangement through which individual undertakings are interconnected. 23
Federal power over local undertakings is essential for the maintenance of that larger national system. 24 To this end, although federal
jurisdiction over broadcasting has historically been grounded on the
extraprovincial nature of a particular undertaking, the extraprovincial nature of broadcasting as a whole indicates that even
individual or provincial "highways" must be under federal jurisdiction.25
The composite system of broadcasting in Canada should serve
the interests of all Canadians and their need to express themselves in
order to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political,
social and economic fabric of Canada." 26 Such interests, and other
national policy objectives, are best protected by federal
jurisdiction.
If the integrity of the broadcasting system cannot be used to
support federal jurisdiction of electronic highways under the interprovincial exception to 92(1 O), the federal Legislature's residual
power to enact laws for the peace, order and good government of
the Dominion provides an alternative source of federal jurisdiction.
The "Peace, Order, and Good Government" (P.O.G.G.) power
generally refers to matters which have not been enumerated under
the heads of federal or provincial jurisdiction in s. 91 or 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. They are thereby conferred on the federal
Parliament. If a matter "goes beyond local or provincial concern or
interest and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the
Dominion as a whole," 27 then it is established as a matter of
23 See Broadcasting Act, supra note 5, s. 3(2).
24 I. H. Fraser, "Some Comments on Subsection 92(10) of the Constitution Act

1867" (1984) 29 McGill L.J. 557.
2 5 Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television
Commission, supra note 4 at 159; Public Service Board v. Dionne, supra note 4 at
197.
26 Broadcasting Act, supra note 5, s. 3(l)(d)(i). See also Bird, supra note 9 at 739.
27 Ontario (/1.G.)v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at 205.
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"national concern" and serves as the basis of the P.O.G.G. power.28
Electronic information highways involved in program
dissemination may be encompassed by the P.O.G.G. power on the
grounds that they are a new area of activity, and a matter of national
concern which may be beyond the power of the provinces to deal
with. 29
The intra-provincial and extra-provincial aspects of "electronic
information highways" are not practically divisible. Their use of
technology represents a component of a single communications system. That type of system has been described as
the electronic thread knitting the country together over
the vast area it occupies, through the sophisticated array
of personal, business, and mass communication services it
provides to all Canadians.
That system is an important vehicle of national unity.
It is a significant creator and carrier of national identity
and culture. 30

Such an holistic approach to the system of communications in
Canada reflects an appropriate basis for policy-making with respect
to the regulation of electronic highways and would decrease unnecessary complexity and duplication in regulating systems.
Without uniformity of law throughout the country, one province
may fail to regulate such things as the maintenance of, or content of
programming on, electronic highways. This would damage the
effectiveness of the entire system, and would negatively impact
users in other provinces.3 1 It is therefore essential to have uniform
legislative treatment of new broadcasting technologies. Without
such treatment, there is a danger that these technologies will
develop in an incoherent manner and that Canadians may simply
become "jaywalkers," rather than active and full participants on new
information highways.

28 johnnesson

v. Rural Municipality ofSt. Paul, [1952] l S.C.R. 292.

29 See P. W. Hogg, supra note 19 at 435ff: R v. Hauser, [1979] l S.C.R. 984. See
also R. v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, [1988] 1 S.C.R 401; Munro v. National
Capital Commission, [1966] S.C.R. 663.
30 Canada, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee
on Communications and Culture (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 5 November 1991) at
15.4.
3I See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., supra note 29.

